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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2988 
___________ 
 
JEAN COULTER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ALLEGHENY COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION; JAMES E. MAHOOD;  
WILDER & MAHOOD; MELAINE S. ROTHEY; CHARLES J. AVALLI;  
LOUIS C. LONG; PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION;  
THOMAS DOERR; ROBERT COLVILLE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 12-00641) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6 
September 7, 2012 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed:  September 13, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jean Coulter appeals from two orders of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, including the order dismissing her complaint.  We will 
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affirm. 
 Because the report and recommendation by the Magistrate Judge contains a 
summary of the proceedings, our description will be brief.  In May 2012, Coulter began a 
civil rights action in District Court against an attorney, his law firm, the Allegheny 
County Bar Association (ACBA), three individual members of the ACBA Special Fee 
Determination Committee, and the Pennsylvania Bar Association.  In her complaint, 
pleaded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Coulter described a fee dispute between the 
attorney and her and complained about the manner in which that dispute was handled by 
the ACBA and its Special Fee Determination Committee.  Two days after the filing of the 
complaint, the Magistrate Judge issued a report in which he recommended that the 
complaint be dismissed sua sponte.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that Coulter did not 
plead sufficient facts to suggest that the defendants had acted “under color of state law” 
as necessary to sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The Magistrate Judge then found 
that, to the extent Coulter characterized the ACBA Special Fee Determination Committee 
as a court and its decision as having been affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas, the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Rooker v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman
 One week later, Coulter filed objections to the report and recommendation as well 
as a motion for recusal, to change venue, and for special relief.  She also filed an 
amended complaint adding two state court judges as defendants.  The Magistrate Judge 
, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  
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then issued a supplemental report in which he recommended that the amended complaint 
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that it still challenged a 
decision of a state court and thus was barred by the Rooker-Feldman
 Coulter appeals.  Our Clerk advised her that her appeal was subject to summary 
action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, and Coulter has submitted argument in 
support of her appeal.   
 doctrine.  The 
Magistrate Judge also noted that Coulter herself recognized that the two judicial 
defendants may be immune from suit.  Coulter filed objections to the supplemental report 
and recommendation and renewed her motion for recusal, to change venue and for special 
relief, which the Magistrate Judge denied.  By order entered June 14, 2012, the District 
Court adopted the supplemental report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and 
dismissed the amended complaint.  The District Court later dismissed Coulter’s appeal of 
the Magistrate Judge’s decision denying her motion for recusal, to change venue, and for 
special relief.  
 We have jurisdiction over final orders of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  “Our standard of review of the District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 
plenary.”  Atkinson v. LaFayette College, 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006).  In 
reviewing the District Court’s judgment we “accept all factual allegations as true, 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, 
under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. 
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Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  We summarily affirm an 
order of the District Court “when ‘no substantial question’ is presented by the appeal.”  
United States v. Baptiste
 A claim for a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be sustained 
only if a defendant has deprived a plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right 
while acting under color of state law.  
, 223 F.3d 188, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citation 
omitted).  
See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 
423 (3d Cir. 2006).  As the report and recommendation explained, none of the defendants 
named in the original complaint is a state actor.  In her submissions on appeal, Coulter 
claims that the defendants acted under color of state law by conspiring with the state 
court judges.  To allege such a conspiracy, the complaint must specifically present facts 
tending to show agreement and concerted action to deprive the plaintiff of his or her 
rights.  The bare allegation of an agreement is insufficient.  Cf. Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 
F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding § 1983 claim in complaint contained sufficient 
allegations of concerted action to withstand motion to dismiss); see also Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly
 We conclude that there is no set of facts from which we can infer any 
understanding between the state court judges and the other defendants to deprive Coulter 
of her constitutional rights.  Coulter refers to “improper connections” and a 
“conspiratorial relationship” among the “co-conspirators”; however, she pleads only 
, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”).   
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vague inferences and allegations.  Bare assertions of joint action or a conspiracy are not 
sufficient to survive dismissal at the pleading stage.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.  In 
sum, as nothing in the complaint demonstrates the existence of any concerted effort 
between the state court judges and the other defendants, we agree with the Magistrate 
Judge’s determination that Coulter failed to demonstrate that the non-judicial defendants 
acted under color of state law.  Of course, the two judges, if sued directly for their own 
actions, are absolutely immune from civil suits for money damages arising from their 
judicial acts.  See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 
349, 355-57 (1978).  It was thus appropriate for the District Court to dismiss Coulter’s 
complaint.1
 Coulter also appeals the District Court’s order affirming the denial of her motion 
for recusal, to change venue, and for special relief.  Coulter complains that the Magistrate 
Judge and District Judge exhibited bias, which required their recusal, and that the 
procedures of the District Court sanction bias against pro se civil rights plaintiffs such 
that the action should have been transferred to another venue.  “We have repeatedly 
stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for 
recusal.”  
 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc.
                                              
1We need not address the District Court’s ruling with respect to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine because we are affirming on other grounds.   
, 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citations omitted).  We find no evidence of bias in the findings or actions of either 
federal judge that might warrant recusal here; thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
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denial of the motion.   
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
